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NEYMAN'S STATISTICAL PIDLOSOPHY 
BY 
E. L. LEHMANN (BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA) 
1. Inductive behavior vs. inductive inference: Neyman and Fisher. A dra-
matics meeting of the Royal Statistical Society occurred on December 18, 1934, 
when R. A. Fisher - already at the height of his fame although not universally 
popular - presented a paper on The logic of iriference. He stated that it was 
concerned with the problem of drawing inferences from the particular to the 
general or, in statistical language, from the sample to the population. He 
pointed out that deductive arguments based on probability were not adequate 
for such inferences, "for reasoning of a genuinely inductive kind," unless one 
used the theory of inverse probability [i.e. Bayesian inference] thereby "making 
it a deduction from the general to the particular." He then advanced the 
ambitious claim that truly inductive reasoning could be based on his concept of 
likelihood, which appeared "to take its place as a measure of rational belief 
when we are reasoning from the sample to the population," and proceeded to 
develop some of its properties. 
The paper was attacked ferociously in the discussion following Fisher's 
presentation, and further objections were raised in later written contributions 
to the discussion. The last of these was by Neyman who started out in a highly 
complimentary vein. He then went on: "The psychology of some readers lead 
them to develop a theory already started along the way indicated. They 
probably think: 'What an interesting problem is raised! how could I develop it 
further?' . .. I personally seem to have another kind of psychology and can't 
help thinking: 'What an interesting way of asking and answering questions, but 
can't I do it differently?"' 
Neyman points out that the properties Fisher establishes in his paper such 
as the asymptotic normality and efficiency of the maximum likelihood 
estimator are obtained on the basis of probability calculations and "not 
because we believe blindly in some magic property of the [likelihood] 
function." 
He then turns to his principal theme, "whether it is possible to construct 
a theory of mathematical statistics independent of the conception of likeli-
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presentation, and an elaboration of Neyman's earlier discussion of it. The 
difference between these two points of view was thought by both Fisher and 
Neyman to be at the heart of their lifelong dispute. 
The possibility and nature of induction is a classical problem of philoso-
phy, and it seems of interest to inquire into the reception of the ideas of Neyman 
and Fisher by philosophers of science. Of course, it takes time for one discipline 
to absorb, acknowledge, or even become aware of the concepts and ideas from 
another. A bridge from the Neyman-Pearson theory of hypothesis testing and 
Neyman's theory of confidence intervals to the philosophy of science was built 
by two highly influential books, which examined these theories from a philoso-
phical point of view: Braithwaite's Scientific Explanation (1953) and Hacking's 
Logic of Statistical Inference (1965). These were followed by a number of other 
monographs and conference proceedings devoted entirely or at least in part to 
philosophical interpretations of various theories of statistical inference, among 
them Gillies (1973), Stegmiiller (1973), Kyburg (1974), Harper and Hooker, Eds. 
(1974), Maxwell and Anderson, Eds. (1975), Rosenkrantz (1977), Asquith and 
Kyburg, Eds. (1979), Seidenfeld (1979), Fetzer (1981), and Howson and Urbach 
(1989). 
In its treatment of induction, this literature mirrors the Fisher-Neyman 
conflict, dividing the authors into 'inductionists,' who discuss how inductive 
inference is or should be carried out, and 'deductionists,' who believe that only 
deductive arguments are legitimate. 
The former group subdivides further according to the medium through 
which induction is to be effected: Fisher's likelihood, his fiducial method, the 
posterior Bayesian probabilities of Jeffreys, De Finetti or Savage, or possibly 
some new approach of their own. For these philosophers, Neyman's ideas are 
either irrelevant or serve only as a foil against which to set forth their preferred 
alternative approach. 
2. Deductivism: Neyman and Popper. The deductivists also speak with 
more than one voice. Here Neyman has a rival in the person of Karl Popper. 
The views of these two men with respect to induction have important 
similarities, as can be seen from Popper's first book of 1934, which appeared in 
an English translation in 1959 under the title The Logic of Scientific Discovery. 
Mter a brief introductory paragraph, Chapter 1 begins with a discussion 
of induction: "According to a widely accepted view - to be opposed in this 
book - the empirical sciences can be characterized by the fact that they use 
'inductive methods,' as they are called." A few pages later, Popper contrasts this 
inductivist view with his own approach: "The theory to be developed in the 
following pages stands directly opposed to all attempts to operate with the 
ideas of inductive logic. It might be described as the deductive method of testing, 
or as the view that a hypothesis can only be empirically tested - and only after 
it has been advanced." Actually, at the time Popper was concerned only with 
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deterministic situations. It was only in later editions that he extended his 
considerations to a stochastic setting. And in his autobiography of 1976 he 
refers (p. 79) to a "nonexistent 'method of induction,' of which nobody has ever 
given a sensible description." One could think that one hears Neyman 
speaking. Not only the terms they use but also the times at which they first put 
forth their ideas are very close. The appearance of Popper's book in 1934(1) is 
sandwiched between the first mention in Neyman-Pearson (1933) of statistical 
tests as 'rules of behavior,' and Neyman's proposal to replace Fisher's inductive 
approach by a purely deductive one in his 1935 discussion of Fisher's paper to 
the Royal Statistical Society. 
Since the difficulties with induction had been known for a long time, it is 
remarkable that independently and nearly simultaneously Neyman and Popper 
found a revolutionary way to finesse the issue by replacing inductive reasoning 
with a deductive process of hypothesis testing. They then proceeded to develop 
this shared central idea in different directions, with Popper pursuing it 
philosophically while Neyman (in his joint work with Pearson) showed how to 
implement it in scientific practice. 
The difference in these two developments is illustrated by their respective 
attitudes toward the outcome of a test. For Popper, the meaning of this 
outcome is central to his approach. Rejection of hypotheses, which he calls 
falsification, is for him the principal tool of the scientific method. On the other 
hand, he never permits hypotheses to be accepted. At best, they receive some 
support from the test, which he calls corroboration. 
In contrast, Neyman and Pearson use the terms acceptance and rejection 
rather casually, with Pearson later (1955) admitting that some of their 
"wording may have been chosen inadequately." And Neyman strongly denies 
that they have any cognitive significance. According to him (Neyman, 1957), 
the outcome of a test is "an act of will or decision to take a particular 
action," ... and again in the next paragraph: "These processes are certainly not 
any sort of 'reasoning' ... ; they are acts of will." 
He states his position even more strongly in his text (Neyman, 1950). A test 
is a choice between two actions A and B which is "interpreted as the adoption or 
the acceptance of one of the hypotheses H or H and the rejection of the other." 
He goes on to warn the reader: ''The terms 'accepting' and 'rejecting' a hypo-
thesis are very convenient and are well established. It is important, however, to 
keep their exact meaning in mind and to discard various additional implications 
which may be suggested by intuition. Thus, to accept a hypothesis H means only 
to decide to take action A rather than action B. This does not mean that we 
necessarily believe that the hypothesis is true. Also, if the application of a rule of 
inductive behavior "rejects H, this means only that the rule prescribes action 
B and does not imply that we believe that H is false." 
e> It appeared in the fall of 1934 but bore the imprint of 1935. 
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However, statisticians tend not to analyze terms as carefully as philoso-
phers do. The line between actions, decisions and acts of will on the one hand, 
and assertions, statements and judgements on the other, is often rather thin. So 
it should not come as a surprise that Neyman's own applied writing sometimes 
crosses this line which he has drawn so firmly. In a paper on the expansion of 
galaxies, for example (Lovasich, Mayall, Neyman, and Scott, 1961), a hypo-
thesis of stability is being tested. Among the conclusions we read: "lfwe admit 
[certain assumptions], then, with outliers included, there is strong evidence 
that at least some of the clusters (and this would include Coma) are unstable. In 
this case, the" chance of error . in asserting instability of at least some of the 
clusters is less than one in a hundred. If the outliers are excluded, no such 
evidence exists; the chance of error in asserting instability may be as large as 
three in four." Similar language is found, for example, in Neyman and Scott 
(1961). 
In denying that the outcome of a test has any cognitive impact, Neyman 
thus seems to have carried his argument too far: it contradicts the reality even 
of his own statistical practice. On the other hand, scientific experiments 
typically are followed by decisions ~ if only whether or not to make a public 
statement. A test then offers a substitute for the unattainable, · but so 
desperately desired, ideal of induction. On the basis of the incomplete 
information provided by the observations, it furnishes a guide to which action 
to take and thus ~ Neyman's evocative phrase ~ to appropriate 'inductive 
behavior.' 
Despite the close connection of their ideas, Neyman and Popper ~ in 
stark contrast to the lifelong feuding of Neyman and Fisher ~ assiduously 
ignored each other. I can find no reference to Popper in Neyman's writings, 
and the few times Popper mentions Neyman, it is as translator of von Mises or 
relates to Neyman's frequentists interpretation of probability. This can, of 
course, partly be explained by the fact that the two men worked in different 
disciplines. It is nevertheless surprising. 
3. Tbe impact of Neyman's work. Neyman's ideas on testing and 
estimation channelled statistical theory into new directions which culminated 
in Wald's general decision theory. How strongly Wald was influenced by 
Neyman's behavioristic point of view can be seen by the explanation Wald 
(1950) offers when formulating his general decision problem-: "The adoption of 
a particular decision function by the experimenter may be termed 'inductive 
behavior,' since it determines uniquely the procedure for carrying out the 
experiment and for making a terminal decision. Thus, the above decision 
problem may be called the problem of inductive behavior." (In a footnote he 
attributes the term to Neyman (1938).) 
But Neyman thought of his behavioristic formulation (as Fisher did of his 
likelihood approach) as an important contribution not only to statistics but 
3 - PAMS 15 
1071
E. L. Lehmann 
also to the philosophical problem of induction. It is of interest to consider the 
reaction of philosophers of science to this claim. In assessing the reception of 
Neyman's ideas by the philosophical community, it is necessary to consider 
more generally the influence of the whole of the modern statistical enterprise 
based on the work of Fisher, Neyman, Pearson and Wald, and also of the 
Bayesians, particularly Jeffreys, De Finetti and Savage. This body of work has 
affected the relevant parts of the philosophy of science in two important ways: 
By changing the emphasis from a deterministic to a stochastic setting(l), and 
by developing methods that permit the implementation of the abstract 
formulations of the philosophy of science. 
The approaches of Fisher, Neyman-Pearson and the Bayesians each have 
their proponents among philosophers of science. But even the expositions of 
inductivists and other opponents of Neyman typically find room for a critical 
discussion of the Neyman-Pearson theory. Thus, Gillies (1973) explains that 
althoJ.Igh the Neyman-Pearson theory "in certain circumstances gives results 
which directly contradict our own approach," nevertheless "an examination of 
the Neyman-Pearson theory is not for us an option but a most pressing 
necessity" because "the Neyman-Pearson theory is still the generally accepted 
theory of testing statistical hypotheses." 
Similarly, Kyburg (1974) justifies devoting a chapter to the "classical" 
theory of Neyman and Pearson by reminding the reader: "By the 1940's, the 
view, primarily associated with the name of Neyman that the fundamental form 
of statistical inference was the choice between statistical hypotheses, had come 
to dominate other views in the English speaking world. It merely dominated 
other views-among statisticians; but it utterly overwhelmed other views among 
those whose interest in statistics was primarily practical." 
These and the other authors listed in Section 2 discuss Neyman's approach 
not because of their liking for it but because of its prominence. However, there 
are also philosophers who strongly support Neyman's point of view. Prominent 
among these is Giere. In his essay (Giere, 1975), for example, he states that the 
approaches of Fisher, Neyman-Pearson, Neyman-Wald, and of "subjective 
Bayesians like Savage" have developed "prototype inductive logics which can 
deal with interesting scientific cases." - "Of these possibilities," he says, "the 
Neyman-Pearson-Wald tradition seems to me most promising." In a later 
section he writes : "The logic adopted here is a version of the theory of statistical 
hypothesis testing developed by Neyman and Pearson .. . This choice is based 
partly on my personal conviction that the Neyman-Pearson viewpoint is 
basically correct. But it is also justified by the tremendous influence this work 
has had for nearly half a century. The Neyman-Pearson approach must count as 
one of the three or four major candidates for a comprehensive inductive logic." 
e> It has been pointed out to me by Brian Skyrms that historically much of the impetus for this 
change came from physics. 
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Another philosopher who strongly supports Neyman's ideas is Hacking 
who writes in 1980: "In my opinion there have been two important con-
tributions to the study of rationality in this century, both negative. One is by 
Jerzy Neyman, the other by Imre Lakatos." And later on: "if you have firm 
beliefs about the future, then you can have detailed beliefs about the future, and 
you can engage in inductive behaviour such as avoiding betting. That is what 
Neyman teaches, and of course, I endorse it. There is no such thing as inductive 
inference, nor a logic of statistical inference or whatever ... " 
The supporters of Neyman, however, are in the minority. As Giere (1975) 
points out ''in recent years, the most active area of interest for philosophers of 
science has been the subjective Bayesian approach to inference and decision 
making. Whatever the causes and reasons for this interest, it is a fact that, of all 
philosophers seriously concerned with the foundations of probability and 
statistics, more prefer some form of subjective account than any other 
approach." 
Had he known about it, Neyman would have been interested in the 
attention philosophers have paid to his ideas, and in the importance statistics 
has acquired in the discussion of induction. He would no doubt have been 
disappointed to learn that his approach has not found more acceptance among 
philosophers. I believe he would have reacted the way he usually did when 
hearing unwelcome news. He would have shrugged his shoulders and said, "too 
bad." 
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